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RESEARCH NOTE
Video games, terrorism, and ISIS’s Jihad 3.0
Ahmed Al-Rawia,b
aDepartment of Communication Studies, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada; bDepartment of Media &
Communication, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This study discusses diﬀerent media strategies followed by the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In particular, the study attempts to under-
stand the way ISIS’s video game that is called “Salil al-Sawarem” (The
Clanging of the Swords) has been received by the online Arab public.
The article argues that the goal behind making and releasing the video
game was to gain publicity and attract attention to the group, and the
general target was young people. The main technique used by ISIS is
what I call “troll, ﬂame, and engage.” The results indicate that the
majority of comments are against ISIS and its game, though most of
the top ten videos are favorable towards the group. The sectarian
dimension between Sunnis and Shiites is highly emphasized in the
online exchanges, and YouTube remains an active social networking
site that is used by ISIS followers and sympathizers to promote the
group and recruit others.
KEYWORDS
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Introduction
Many global terrorist organizations such as ISIS are increasingly trying to recruit Western
youth.1 According to US intelligence experts, about 1000 foreign ﬁghters join ISIS every
month.2 Some of those recruits come from Western countries. According to a source in the
FBI, there are over 150 Americans who are allegedly in Syria to ﬁght for ISIS,3 while the
Canadian Intelligence agency estimates that about 130 Canadians have already joined ISIS as
of 2014.4 According to the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on National Security and
Defence (SSCNSD), “eighty radicalized Canadians have been identiﬁed as participating with
terrorists overseas and have returned to Canada and approximately 145 Canadians are
believed to be abroad providing support to terrorist groups.”5
Indeed, ISIS is a terrorist organization that has an “apocalyptic, end-of-days strategic
vision,” as Army general Martin Dempsey rightly describes it.6 The organization evolved
to be a more radical and dangerous extension of Al-Qaeda terrorist group.7 According to a
senior leading ﬁgure in this group, the ideological foundation of ISIS was established in
Camp Bucca, which was the largest US detention facility in Iraq. Due to the time prisoners
spent at the Camp and the fact that many other insurgent members were detained there, it
became a fertile ground for extremism wherein Islamists managed to hold numerous
meetings and make detailed agreements for future plans.8 When ISIS advanced in the
Sunni provinces, it looted banks and became the richest terrorist group in the world.9 It
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also committed war crimes as hundreds of captured Iraqi soldiers, especially Shiites, were
executed, while the Yezihdi and Christian minorities suﬀered a great deal as many were
forced to ﬂee to Iraqi Kurdistan.10 However, the main areas identiﬁed that sustain ISIS’s
power grip are related to “psychological tactics such as terrorizing populations, religious
and sectarian narratives, [and] economic controls.”11
Literature review
Back in 1982, Schmid and de Graaf emphasized that “an act of terrorism is in reality an act
of communication. For the terrorist, the message matters, not the victim.”12 Numerous
other scholars rightly claim that communication and terrorism go hand in hand because
communication is the oxygen of terrorist acts.13 Similarly, Freedman and Thussu believe
that media outlets are at the core of terrorism because they are “increasingly seen as active
agents in the actual conceptualization of terrorist events.”14 As discussed below, ISIS fully
exploits various media platforms in order to disseminate fearful messages and create an
eﬀective impact on their receivers.
In contemporary times, one of the main platforms mentioned above is social media,
which plays a major role in people’s lives. In fact, some scholars believe that social media
can become instrumental in uniting and sometimes radicalizing the public in relation to
political and social issues.15 Al-Qaeda, for example, has been active on many online
forums for several years waging an E-Jihad to recruit sympathizers and spread its
ideology.16 It also created a “jihadist cloud” which allowed it to maintain “its virtual
spaces and niches on the Internet.”17 These (oﬄine) extremists groups use modern
technology and the Internet as the main means to inﬂuence others. “For the terrorists
themselves, new media are, collectively, a transformative tool that oﬀers endless possibi-
lities for communication and expansion.”18 In this regard, there are diﬀerent psychological
motivations that lead some individuals to join extremist groups that can be categorized as
“revenge seekers [who] need an outlet for their frustration, status seekers [who] need
recognition, identity seekers [who] need a group to join, and thrill seekers [who] need
adventure.”19
Video games and terrorism
In relation to video games and terrorism, a number of games directly deal with terror-
related issues, especially in connection with the War on Terror. For example, Splinter Cell
is a game that revolves around the 9/11 events,20 while Counter-Strike allows teams from
opposing sides to take the role of terrorists as well as counter-terrorists.21 Similar to
Counter-Strike, other games like America’s Army, Modern Warfare 2, and Medal of Honor:
Warﬁghter allow players to become terrorists, which could have some psychological and
educational beneﬁts.22 In 2006, Al-Qaeda group made changes to the ﬁrst person shooter
(FPS) game Quest for Saddam (2003) and introduced another game called Quest for Bush.
The goal of the original game was to kill Iraqi soldiers and capture Saddam Hussein,
whereas Al-Qaeda completely reversed the players’ roles. Further, the Iraqi American
artist, Wafaa Bilal, made more adaptations to the same game, which he called Night of
Bush Capturing: A Virtual Jihadi (2008).23 As a social and artistic experience, Bilal’s video
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game version created some controversy because the player was “in the position of a suicide
bomber whose aim is to kill the president of the United States.”24
On the other hand, video games by the Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian Afkar Media
company were used as alternative media outlets to oﬀer playing roles that were contrary to
the mainstream Western representation of Arab Muslims.25 In this way, “video games
provide violent non-state actors and organizations sympathetic to them with a means of
presenting their grievances and displaying their ﬁghting prowess in ways that advance the
organizations’ strategic goals.”26 Some of these alternative games include Quraish and
Under Siege, which were both produced by Afkar Media.27
Trolling, ﬂaming, and social media eﬀects
This paper covers two concepts that are related to the use of harsh and violent language,
namely trolling and ﬂaming. There is, however, a conceptual problem in deﬁning these
two terms because of the apparent overlap between them. In fact, “trolling and ﬂaming
often merge, in that in both cases there is intent to disrupt the ongoing conversation, and
both can lead to extended aggravated argument.”28 In this regard, the relative anonymity
of online users enhances the kind of ﬂaming or trolling that can occur on diﬀerent
platforms.29 In general, the two terms involve using some kind of negative face that is
explained below by employing computer-mediated communication.
The literature on these two types of anti-social behavior is also connected to studies
and reports on child protection practices. In general, there is often a sense of moral
panic, risk, and public anxiety when it comes to children’s Internet exposure and use.30
Social media use could have negative eﬀects on the well-being of some adolescents
including what is known as “E-Crime 2.0,” which includes “oﬀences that exploit the
ways in which users of new communication technologies make themselves publicly
visible and available through new social media.”31 Some of the harmful social media
eﬀects that are reported in previous research on adolescents and children include “social
isolation, depression and cyber-bullying.”32 In a large-scale study that involved about
10,000 EU children, the respondents themselves reported certain types of risks that they
ﬁnd on the Internet including pornography, cyber-bullying, and violent content.33 Other
types of harmful eﬀects include “poor self-rating of mental health and experiences of
high levels of psychological distress and suicidal ideation.”34 Indeed, exposure to violent
content seems to be one of the main recurrent public concerns when it comes to social
media use by adolescents and children.
In their politeness theory, Brown and Levinson discuss the diﬀerent motivations behind
using negative face. For example, it might be used when discussing “dangerously emo-
tional or divisive topics e.g. politics, race, religion.”35 Some of the goals behind employing
it include certain kinds of “orders and requests” made to denote to the other person a
desire to do or refrain from doing something.36 In their compliance gaining theory,
Marwell and Schmitt discussed several techniques to persuade people including “punish-
ing activity,” which refers to the use of negative face or actions which usually entail
uttering threats.37 Though the study was published long before the emergence of the
Internet, trolling and ﬂaming can be linked to this theoretical concept since they can be
regarded as an online attempt to gain compliance by either modifying or preventing
certain kinds of behavior with the persistent use of negative face.
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In relation to trolling, one of the ﬁrst studies that examined it was conducted by
Donath on Usernet groups.38 Also, Hardaker provides several deﬁnitions for trolling
and classiﬁes it into diﬀerent types based on four main features: aggression, deception,
disruption, and success. In relation to this study, two categories are more relevant. The
ﬁrst one is called thwarted/frustrated impoliteness, which refers to the malicious intent of
a message, but its intention is frustrated or thwarted by the receiver either because (s)he is
not oﬀended, so no action is taken (frustrated), or because it is countered by, for example,
“sarcasm, contempt, amusement, or suchlike” (thwarted). The second type is called
genuine, malicious, or strategic impoliteness, which successfully achieves its goal in
oﬀending the receiver(s).39 Further, Bishop discusses two types of trolling: ﬂame trolling
and kudus trolling. The former refers to vitriolic comments that are not intended to be
humorous, unlike the latter type. Again, the overlap between the two terms is obvious
here. Bishop also classiﬁed people who troll others into diﬀerent types,40 yet none of the
classiﬁcations he oﬀered could be applicable to this study on mediated terrorism.
In all cases, trolling seeks to create an argument, entice others into endless discussion,
or hijack a discussion.41 In other words, trolling is meant as a distraction from the main
online discussion in the forum or platform by diverting attention to another issue which is
mostly irrelevant.
Similar to trolling, there is no agreement on a uniﬁed deﬁnition of ﬂaming, but it
usually “consists of aggressive or hostile communication occurring via computer-mediated
channels.”42 Indeed, ﬂaming is similar to trolling, but the language is usually harsher,
more personal and is far more aggressive since it contains insults, obscenity, swearing, and
curses,43 especially if the topic relates to religion.44
Whether trolling or ﬂaming, ISIS sympathizers run what is called “‘disseminator’
accounts” on social media, especially Twitter, which “lend moral and political support
to those in the conﬂict.”45 It is also known as the Swarmcast model in communication
studies; “once content is produced and released, it is often the distributing network of
media mujahideen, rather than the original producer, that ensures continuing content
availability.”46 This model suggests that sympathizers gather like a swarm of bees or birds
that always re-organize themselves and are ready to engage and attack at any given time.
In the following section, a discussion is made on ISIS’s media techniques.
ISIS communication strategy
ISIS employs a communication strategy that is based on highlighting certain appeals.
Haroro J. Ingram identiﬁed three media strategies followed by ISIS: “the use of a multi-
dimensional, multi-platform approach that simultaneously targets ‘friends and foes’ to
enhance the reach, relevance and resonance of its messaging; the synchronisation of
narrative and action to maximise operational and strategic ‘eﬀects’ in the ﬁeld; and the
centrality of the Islamic State ‘brand’ to its entire campaign.”47 In this regard, the high
number of ISIS recruits indicates that ISIS is still successful since one of its most
important appeals being employed is its professed link to a conservative version of
Islam (salaf or pious predecessors). This claim is used as a marketing tool by ISIS as its
members insist on utilizing the black banner which was originally used by Muslims when
Islam ﬁrst emerged. Further, the group’s name itself is meant to sound Islamic (ISIS), or
later abbreviated as the Islamic State (Tandheem Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiah). Third, there is
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an ongoing ﬂow of information from cities controlled by ISIS, showing that the group
intends to rule in a utopian way that is allegedly reminiscent of early Islam, especially in
relation to highlighting religious duties and obligations.48 The above claims are all meant
to brand ISIS as a purely Islamic group,49 so any attack against its members is regarded as
an attack against Islam itself. For example, ISIS’s Dabiq magazine refers to anyone that
ﬁghts the group as an enemy of Islam, inﬁdel, or apostate. In an article on Abū Sinān an-
Najdī, who was killed in his attack on the Āl Salūl Emergency Task Force in Saudi Arabia,
the writer pledges revenge against Saudi security forces: “By Allah! You will not enjoy
safety and security, and you will not have a comfortable life as long as you wage war
against Islam and the Muslims and remain as tails of the West, which plays around with
you as it pleases. Your coalition with the Majūs [pejorative for Shiites] and the Crusaders
against Ahlus-Sunnah [Sunnis] in Iraq and Shām is the biggest witness against you.”50
Further, ISIS repeatedly portrays itself as “the protective vanguard for the world’s Sunni
Muslims,”51 while the theme of victimhood in the sense that Muslims, especially Sunnis,
are victims of world powers is prominent in ISIS’s promotional materials.52 Indeed,
equating the group with Islam and the Sunni faith is one of the appeals that drives
some devout Muslims to join this criminal organization.
On the other hand, ISIS also releases favorable images by showing its charitable side,
such as helping elderly people or organizing life in the cities they control. Some also show
ﬁghters relaxing, swimming, eating, and playing with cats.53 According to a study con-
ducted by Voactiv on ISIS’s promotional materials for about a one-month period, 45% of
the materials posted online are focused “on its eﬀorts to build and sustain the caliphate.”54
The study also found that only 2% of the materials posted targeted the West, in compar-
ison to 4% on Libya that recently witnessed a growing ISIS presence. James Farwell claims
that these “warmer images aim to communicate the message that, while strictly Islamic,
ISIS stands for promoting the welfare of people, not murdering them.”55 Yet this is not the
only message ISIS wants to communicate, as the main intention behind releasing such
positive images is to give the impression to the outside world as well as to the people they
control that the group is strong and resilient as it is not aﬀected by the ongoing military
operations against its ﬁghters. Further, some recruits seek thrilling experiences and
adventure and regard ISIS as the “hippest”56 and “sexiest jihadi group on the block.”57
Bennhold observes that some young ISIS recruits come “from a world in which . . . Islam is
punk rock. The headscarf is liberating. Beards are sexy.”58 Other reports on “pop jihadists”
in Europe ﬁt this category, and they are deﬁned as “Muslim youngsters who ﬂirt with
terrorist symbols” with the use of social media.59
Finally and most importantly, ISIS uses propaganda and misinformation which are
based on disseminating its ideology to as many people as possible and in various
languages. President Obama revealed some of ISIS’s strategies in a speech delivered
in February 2015: “The high-quality videos, the online magazines, the use of social
media, terrorist Twitter accounts—it’s all designed to target today’s young people
online, in cyberspace.”60 Aside from the diﬀerent tools that circumvent Internet censor-
ship, ISIS and its aﬃliates and sympathizers use Al-Hayat, Al-Furqan, and Al-Ethar
media centers, which function as their centralized Information Ministry. These diﬀer-
ent media centers use social media outlets like YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook besides
certain websites, radio stations, the Clanging of the Swords promotional videos, and its
Dabiq magazine to disseminate their ideology.61 The New York Times is accurate in
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describing ISIS media strategy as Jihad 3.062 due to its highly sophisticated media
campaign that involves the use of “multidimensional propaganda,”63 high-tech ﬁlming,
and editing equipment.64 The term is originally derived from Web 3.0, which devel-
oped from Web 2.0. According to Manuel Castells, this new phenomenon refers to “the
cluster of technologies, devices, and applications that support the proliferation of social
spaces on the Internet thanks to increased broadband capacity, open source software,
and enhanced computer graphics and interface, including avatar interaction in three-
dimensional virtual spaces.”65 Indeed, ISIS is making full use of diﬀerent technologies
that are not conﬁned to social media, especially Twitter, but extend to video games,
hacking by its Cyber Caliphate Army, apps, and the Dark Web.
According to an ISIS follower, the group uses a few centralized Twitter accounts that
“tweet oﬃcial statements and news updates” as well as provincial accounts run from the
provinces ISIS controls, “which publish a live feed about [local] Isis operations.”66 In
addition, there are ISIS “jihobbyists,”67 fan clubs, or followers and sympathizers, for it is
estimated that ISIS has about 46,000 Twitter accounts that are sympathetic to or suppor-
tive of the group, which are mostly based in Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia,68 prompting the
EU to commission the European Law Enforcement Agency, Europol, to block ISIS access
to social media.69 This decentralized communication method makes it challenging to
counter ISIS messages,70 though it can oﬀer some security beneﬁts like disclosing valuable
information about the location of some ISIS ﬁghters.71 According to Berger and Morgan’s
study on ISIS Twitter accounts, 73% of the followers selected Arabic as their main
language followed by 18% English and 6% French, “a ﬁnding that tracks to some extent
with the distribution of Western foreign ﬁghters.”72 In fact, the Arabic language has long
been one of the fastest growing languages on Twitter, with more than 2 million tweets
posted every single day.73
Other media platforms are actively exploited by ISIS. In April 2014, ISIS “introduced an
Android app, called ‘The Dawn of Glad Tidings,’ which leverages Twitter users’ accounts
to share ISIS-related tweets.”74 It was only recently that ISIS moved to another social
network called “Diaspora” and other lesser known networks and websites like Friendica,
Quitter, Justpaste, Ask.fm, Soundcloud, and Mixlr after its Twitter accounts were
blocked.75 In terms of online inﬂuence, it seems that ISIS has a wide network of followers
and/or sympathizers that exist not only in the Middle East region but that extend to North
America and Europe.76
It is important to note here that the shocking beheading and killing images and
videos that are disseminated by ISIS are meant to create awareness about the group and
its activities similar to the shock advertising techniques used by some commercial
corporations which are well documented in previous scientiﬁc research.77 This is
another persuasive strategy as ISIS attempts to brand itself as a savage group that is
defending Islam against the inﬁdels, represented by anyone that ﬁghts them. In this
regard, social networking sites are mostly used to attract attention and entice possible
victims, after which other communication technologies are used, especially mobile
services like Viber, Surespot, WhatsApp, FaceTime, Kik, Skype, and Telegram.78 In
brief, the diﬀerent platforms used and media strategies followed by ISIS that seem to
complement each other indicate that this group is waging a new Jihad that goes beyond
what Web 2.0 oﬀers, making it far more eﬀective than traditional terrorist organiza-
tions like Al-Qaeda.
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ISIS’s video game
The focus of this study is on the video game released by ISIS that is adapted from the well-known
Grand Theft Auto (GTA). In particular, the research is limited to the videos and comments
posted on this video game trailer. It is not clear whether the gamewas truly produced or not; it is
also not clear who exactly developed it since there are many links to the video game, especially
those leading to torrent websites. However, the current links either do not work or lead to
malicious websites (see for example Figure 1).79 Certainly, the video game’s trailer is not
produced by the centralized media centers of ISIS like Al-Hayat, Al-Furqan, and Al-Ethar,
especially in that the group stands against entertainment activities like listening to music or
playing games that can divert attention from prayer and faith.80 This means that the game is
made by some ISIS followers or sympathizers probably outside the group’s controlled territories.
In terms of its development, it is not diﬃcult to make changes to the original GTA game by
customizing characters or playing opposing roles similar to America’s Army and Modern
Warfare 2, as mentioned above (see Figure 2). As for the date of ISIS’s video game release,
one of the ﬁrst videos to report on the GTA game appeared on YouTube in June 2014, but the
game became more popular in September of the same year, based on a Google search in Arabic
using the term “Download Salil al-Sawarem’s game.” “Salil al-Sawarem” is also the name given
by ISIS to its motivational religious chant, which must be distinguished from the video game.81
In all cases, the game is called “Salil al-Sawarem” in Arabic (The Clanging of the Swords),
which is a ﬁrst person shooter game.82 The game’s cover reads: “Your games which are
producing from you, we do the same actions in the battleﬁelds!!”83 In other words, the types of
real armed confrontations ISIS is engaged with are similar to the virtual wars produced in
Western video games. Further, the name itself given to the game is also supposed to project the
idea of strength, fearlessness, and resilience at times of war. It is alleged that ISIS adapted
Figure 1. A seemingly malicious website that hosts ISIS’s game. The ﬁle looks malicious because its size
is only 375KB, which is too small for a game like GTA.
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another ﬁrst person shooter game called RMA IIIwhich is developed for Microsoft84 as well as
another version of the famous Call of Duty.85
In general, the target group of such video games is young people who are supposed to bemore
attracted to violent and ﬁrst shooter games. There seems to be certain emotional appeals for
young male adolescents to play ﬁrst shooter games,86 including a desire to “experience fantasies
of power and fame, to explore and master what they perceive as exciting and realistic environ-
ments (but distinct from real life), to work through angry feelings or relieve stress, and as social
tools.”87 Other studies showed that there is a positive correlation between adolescents’ anger,
frustration, and peer rejection on the one hand and preference for antisocial media content and
cyberbullying on the other hand.88 Indeed, violent video games are more appealing for adoles-
cents than for adults,89 partly due to the wishful identiﬁcation with some of the games’
characters.90 Asmentioned above, some view ISIS as a “cool” organization in its Jihad 3.0 eﬀorts,
so producing such games can help in recruiting young people to its organization.
Results and discussion
In terms of methodology, an Arabic language search was made on YouTube using the term
“ISIS’s Salil al-Sawarem game” on September 5, 2015. YouTube is selected because it is regarded
as one of the most famous video platforms in the world,91 and YouTube gaming channels that
attract people from diﬀerent ages, especially teenagers, are regarded as the most popular ones.92
In fact, YouTube gaming oﬀers massive economic opportunities for videogame producers and
professional gamers because of the large number of fans.93 According to Forbes magazine,
YouTube gaming channels bring in over 3.5 billion views a month as of June 2014.94
The top ten clips were selected based on the number of views (See Table 1),95 and a
content analysis of the posted videos and their comments was conducted to understand
Figure 2. ISIS’s video game cover.
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their tone or valence in terms of expressing negative, positive, or neutral views towards the
game and its sponsor.96 The tone of the video towards ISIS and its video game was
assessed based on what is presented in the video itself, the title, and/or its accompanying
description. This is a method that has been followed in many studies on YouTube videos
and their comments.97
In relation to this study, video clips (8) and (9) mostly presented the game in a neutral
way, yet their descriptions referred to ISIS as a state that must remain forever (Baqyyah
# ﺑﺎﻗﻳﺔ ), or that it was the one which follows the right path of Prophet Muhammed. Hence,
these two videos were coded as positive towards ISIS and the game. If the stance was not
clear, the video was coded as neutral. Before coding all the videos and comments, two
coders examined over 10% of the sample (n = 3 videos and 50 comments), and intercoder
reliability was measured using Cohen’s Kappa. A .890 agreement was reached that was
very acceptable.98
The total number of views for these ten videos was 286,688 and the earliest clip posted
was on June 7, 2014. The highest number of views (119,861) and comments (196) was for
a video that made fun of the game and ISIS that was posted by an Iraqi comedian who
imitates Jon Stewart and Bassem Youssef. As for the tone of posted videos, there were
more positive clips towards ISIS and its video game (n = 6) than negative (n = 2) or
neutral (n = 2) ones. In fact, some video posters openly showed their support for ISIS. For
example, video clip number (2) is posted by user “Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s lovers,” while
many other commentators have ISIS’s black banner as their users’ photo (see Figure 3).
With regard to the total number of likes and dislikes, it was only accurate to count them
by taking into account the tone of the videos posted. In total, there were 1,944 dislikes
(68.3%) of the game and ISIS in comparison to 901 likes (31.5%).
As for the comments, there were in total 397 comments and replies on the posted
videos. Due to the highly personal nature of replies, they were discarded from the study
together with any irrelevant and ambiguous posts. In total, 199 comments were identiﬁed;
57.2% (n = 114) of the comments were negative towards the game and ISIS, 33.6%
(n = 67) comments were positive, and 9% (n = 18) were neutral without supporting any
side (see Figure 4). With regard to the negative comments, they usually contained praise
for anyone who criticized ISIS and its game, which was usually ridiculed for the claim that
it was independently developed from Grand Theft Auto. For example, YouTuber “Hadji
M” mentioned that “this is a famous American video game, and any person with some
experience in programming can change the shapes of its characters and even the sound
eﬀects.” Further, most of the criticism was centered on showing that ISIS did not represent
Islam and/or that Shiite militias ﬁghting ISIS were victorious. As for the positive com-
ments that praised the game and ISIS, they constituted 33.6% of the total comments.
These results closely correspond with the number of video dislikes (68.3%) of the game
and their likes (31.5%). Despite the dominance of negative comments against ISIS, there
was still an active group of sympathizers and followers who mostly believed that support-
ing ISIS online was an expression of their devotion to Sunni Islam, allegedly under attack
by Shiites. To give a few examples, YouTuber “Islamic Flood” says: “You’ve reached a
cowardice stage that you’re afraid of an Islamic State’s game. . . . Hail to the Islamic state’s
men and let [Allah] fortify its Mujahideen. . . . The Islamic State has defeated you in all the
religious, military, cultural and even electronic fronts.” Another YouTuber called
“Muhammed Al-Mutairi” gave ISIS a more regional scope, stating: “We wish the game’s
10 A. AL-RAWI
Figure 3. Screenshot of the video game trailer uploaded by the user “Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s lovers.”
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Figure 4. Tone of comments on the top 10 YouTube videos.
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objective is to make the Mujahideen heroes. . . . Their goal is to spread Islam, defend the
righteous, and lift injustice from Muslims. . . . Frankly, we need such games in order to
have a new generation whose goal is to remove Israel and its agents from Muslim lands.”
Finally, YouTuber “Hasoon A” connected his favorable comment towards ISIS with
famous Twitter hashtags such as “ISIS remains” that is mentioned above, saying: “It’ll
expand (# ﲤﺘﺪ ); if you leave it alone, it’ll be strengthened (# ﺗﺸﺘﺪ ). By Allah’s will, if you ﬁght it,
it’ll remain (# ﺑﺎﻗﻴﺔ ).”
As mentioned above, almost all the replies were personal, containing attacks on
individual posters who opposed ISIS or vice versa. These replies were highly sectarian in
nature as there was intense ﬂaming in the kind of exchange of obscene language and
religious curses especially between Sunnis and Shiites. For example, any criticism against
ISIS was interpreted by some of the group’s sympathizers as criticism against Islam and/or
the Sunni faith. This ﬁnding is similar to other studies that examined religious comments
on YouTube and the divisive sectarian rhetoric that characterizes this platform.99 The
prevalent use of the negative face by the two opposing online communities was expected
because of the nature of the religious topic discussed.100 The main function of the negative
face was to gain compliance via punishing activity.101 This was routinely done by using
ﬂaming in order to either force the opponents to leave the platform/video commentary
section or make them stop writing negative comments.
Further and in relation to the swarming communication model, ISIS followers seemed
to gather around videos that referred to DAESH ( ﺪﺎﻋﺷ ), which is the Arabic acronym of
ISIS. The term itself is regarded as demeaning by ISIS, which prohibits people living under
its control from using it.102 ISIS followers are usually very active in responding to ISIS
criticism and are often accompanied by other users who share the same beliefs. Similar to
a swarming activity, they closely coordinate and synchronize their trolls as they suddenly
appear to assist some ISIS members in the exchange of insults, and they disappear
afterwards. It is like waging a constant online war.
The other main function of this trolling activity is to silence opposition and dissent,
especially that which comes from Shiite Muslims. Most importantly, the trolling and
ﬂaming game played by ISIS followers on YouTube serves the purpose of winning some
oppositional or neutral voices to their side since the exchange of insults frequently results
in curses against Sunni ﬁgures who are highly venerated, like Prophet Mohammed’s
companions. In this way, ISIS followers will get the required evidence that Shiites hold
antagonistic views against Sunnis, which might produce the possible impact on some
devout Sunnis. This sophisticated technique is similar to what is used by ISIS on English-
language platforms that target Westerners. For example, Shawn Carrie observes that
condemning ISIS on Twitter usually results in “openly mixing statements like ‘support
our troops’ mingled cozily next to ‘kill all muslims.’”103 Carrie emphasizes that the latter
term is repeatedly used by ISIS as a recruitment tool to convince some that there is
inherent Western hatred and an ongoing attack against Islam and that ISIS is the only
group that truly defends the doctrine. Further, other news reports like “US Gun-maker
Creates ‘Crusader’ Riﬂe to Fight Islamic State”104 are regarded by ISIS as excellent
examples that support their abovementioned claim.
In this regard, this trolling and ﬂaming game, which I call the “troll, ﬂame, and engage”
technique, is regarded as an eﬀective recruitment tool in ISIS’s Jihad 3.0 eﬀorts. It is
important to note here that some of the attempts made by ISIS followers and sympathizers
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to create a reaction from the online audience fail in what is called thwarted/frustrated
impoliteness.105 These attempts to agitate YouTubers are meant to be tactical diversions
from the main negative discussion on and criticism of ISIS, which is what characterizes
trolling.106 Yet, a few other attempts by ISIS followers can be categorized as genuine,
malicious, or strategic impoliteness107 because they succeed in oﬀending their opponents
by using highly obscene terms, insults, and curses. For example, Figure 5 shows how one
YouTuber, “Layth Jamal,” systematically ﬂames by posting abusive comments in response
to anyone criticizing ISIS in order to gain compliance. He starts trolling one user,
“Abdulla ahmmad12,” and is suddenly accompanied by YouTuber “Gvhh Gbj,” who
both personally attack and succeed in oﬀending their target. In the end, they engage
him by using sectarian rhetoric which is meant to gain his support, silence him, or force
him to abandon the online platform. In the example given here, “Abdulla ahmmad12”
starts questioning “Layth Jamal” for the latter’s ﬂaming language. In his response, “Layth
Figure 5. Trolling, ﬂaming, and engaging on YouTube.
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Jamal” says: “I have started insulting any Shiite I encounter online though they still post
negative comments against me” because he praises ISIS. In this case, “Layth Jamal”
believes that ﬂaming can drive users away from the platform or from posting negative
comments. Further, the sectarian language was meant to engage others, for “Abdulla
ahmmad12” responded by saying: “By Allah, I’m a Sunni myself.” “Layth Jamal” further
manipulated the sectarian discussion by questioning “Abdulla ahmmad12”’s faith: “If you
are a Sunni, how come you encourage them to make such oﬀensive clips that insult the
Prophet. The Shiites sent me private messages in which they cursed Abu Bakr, Othman,
and Aysha [Muhammed’s companions].” Further, “Gvhh Gbj” oﬀered his apology for
ﬂaming, stating that he thought that “Abdulla ahmmad12” was a “dirty and ﬁlthy Shiite.”
The online engagement ended with a cheerful tone due to reaching some kind of mutual
understanding. In brief, “Layth Jamal” and “Gvhh Gbj” made use of the anonymous
feature of YouTube to swarm and troll others whenever they found a suitable video that
demeaned ISIS. The purpose was to divert attention from the main discussion, and
ﬂaming was used if the impoliteness was thwarted or frustrated, which ultimately ended
in engaging some neutral or opposing voices.
Conclusion
The general goal behind making and releasing Salil al-Sawarem’s video game is to gain
publicity and attract attention to the group. This is part of the group’s Jihad 3.0 eﬀorts, as
the main target is young people who might get the impression that ISIS is a technologi-
cally advanced group that not only produces high-deﬁnition and well-edited videos but
also has its owns apps, social media tools, drones, and video games. The ﬁndings of this
study show that the majority of comments and number of likes and dislikes are against
ISIS and its video game, but YouTube remains one of the main online platforms wherein
ISIS is still sharing and spreading its messages, which is evident in the high number of
favorable ISIS videos. Also, there are a considerable number of followers and sympathizers
who constantly try to inﬂuence others by using trolls, ﬂames, and certain kinds of
engagements, while a highly divisive and sectarian rhetoric is used in order to polarize
the audience and possibly gain the support of some users.
For future research, more studies are needed in order to examine other social media
platforms like Facebook in order to investigate whether swarming and the troll, ﬂame, and
engage method is also used by ISIS followers. Further, interviews with online users who
are actively engaged with ISIS members are needed in order to further understand the
various motivations and possible eﬀects of this online interaction with a focus on gender,
sectarian discussion, and age.
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